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LANDLORD AND TENANT: THE CALIFORNIA LANDLORD'S
REMEDIES UPON ABANDONMENT OF THE PREMISES
BY THE TENANT
By Ajmx. B. YAXUIns
Scope of This Comment
The basic fact situation involved in the cases to be examined here is a
simple one: For some reason, or for no reason, a tenant abandons leased
premises before expiration of. the term.
Upon such an occurrence, the landlord will naturally want to know,
"What can I do about this?" As a practical matter, the specific question
will most often be, "Can I make a new lease and hold the old tenant liable
for any deficiency in the rent?" A long line of California cases have
addressed themselves to answering this question. Some would respond "Yes"
to the landlord's query, others would say "No," and still others would
conclude "Maybe."
This article will furnish a chronological resuma of the cases reaching
the Supreme Court of California, and discuss the competing theories
involved.
Status of the Parties Upon Abandonment
That the tenant abandons the premises does not affect his liability
for rent.1 The tenant has an estate which "stays alive" whether he elects to
remain in possession or not. Accordingly, the California cases are unanimous
in holding that, should the tenant abandon the premises, the landlord is
as entitled as before to the installments of rent, and can sue for them as
they become due. The cases also agree that the landlord may enter upon
abandoned premises to prevent waste, and that such reentry will not
prejudice his position.
Subsequent Conduct of the Landlord
A. One View: Emphasis Upon "Conveyance"
One method of analysis is to consider the basic problem to be one
of conveyancing. The tenant's continued liability for rent would depend
upon a finding of whether or not a surrender has taken place.
Surrender is a form of conveyance operating by force of the common
law. It is defined by Lord Coke to be "a yielding up an estate for life or
years to him that hath an immediate estate in reversion or remainder,
' For a general discussion and for collections of the many cases, see: 3 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 902 (3d ed. 1939) ; 32 Am. JuR., Landlord and Tenant, § 517 (1941) ; 52 CJ.S., Land-
lord and Tenant § 497 (1947).
(189)
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wherein the estate for life or yeares may drowne by mutual agreement
between them."2 Since the Statute of Frauds,3 express surrenders are required
to be in writing. The statute, however, does not affect those surrenders which
take place by operation of law; where the law infers a surrender from
certain acts by the parties which are inconsistent with the continued distinct
existence of the two former estates.
It would, for example, be inconsistent for the landlord to take unquali-
fied possession of the premises on his own account and still urge that the
old tenancy is in effect. It would be even more inconsistent should the
landlord create a new tenancy by making a lease to another party. In either
case a surrender of operation of law is perfected, and the tenant is as free
from liability for rent as he would be if an express surrender in writing
had returned the right of possession to the landlord.4
B. Another View: Emphasis Upon "Contract"
Practical considerations have influenced many jurisdictions to give
judicial approval to an importation of the contract principle of mitigation of
damages into actions for the rent, giving the landlord the privilege of
making a new lease and still holding the original tenant liable for any
deficiency in the rent.5
The argument in favor of such a rule is often organized in terms of
"the lease contract," "repudiation" and "damages." Some cases, on the
other hand, consider a new lease to work a surrender only if the landlord
intended to thus "accept" the surrender.
Perhaps the realistic approach of the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire6 is the most useful one:
"It is frequently said that the rule that the tenant's liability is terminated
by the reletting as a matter of law, irrespective of notice, is supported by the
better logic, but that strong practical considerations justify the adoption of
the rule generally followed. Of course, it cannot be denied that where the
landlord relets he performs an act repugnant to the continuance of the
former tenancy ...but this does not necessarily mean that his right to
sue on the original undertaking is either illogical or out of harmony with
the prevailing trend of the law in analogous situations."'7
The parties may, and often do, eliminate many bothersome questions
in this area by covenanting that, upon the termination of the tenancy by
reentry or equivalent action on the part of the landlord, he may relet to
another at the risk of the tenant, the tenant remaining liable for any
COKE LITT. p. 337b (Cit Perkins p. 581; 2 Rolle Abr. p. 494).
' 29 CAR. 2, c. 3 (1677); CALIF. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1971.
44 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 962 (3d ed. 1939) ; 32 Am. Jun., Landlord and Tenant § 916
(1941) ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 124, 125 (1947).
5 Supra, note 4.
6 Novak v. Fontaine Furniture Co., 84 N. H. 93, 146 A. 525 (1929).
Id. at 94, 146 A. at 526.
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deficiency in the amount so obtained. Such covenants seem to be enforced
everywhere.
Early California Cases
The first significant case on this question to come before the Supreme
Court of California appeared in 1890, In re Bell.' The tenant had abandoned
the premises. The landlord had made no new lease, but brought his action to
collect damages for "prospective rents." The court held that the action
had been prematurely brought, but went on to say that "the lessor might
have relet the premises for the benefit of the original tenant."
In June of the following year, the court had another opportunity to
consider the point, in Respini v. Porta.° The tenant had abandoned "certain
real and personal property." The landlord resumed possession and made
a new lease to a third party. The court was of the opinion that:
"In cases of this kind, the landlord is not entitled to recover for rent
of the premises after abandonment of them by defendant, but has compen-
sation for the injury, and his measure of damage is the difference between
the rent he was to receive and the rent actually received from the subsequent
tenant, provided there has been good faith in the subsequent reletting."' 0
Within two months of that opinion, another case reached the Supreme
Court of California involving the same basic fact situation. In Welcome v.
Hess" the tenant abandoned the premises and the landlord went into posses-
sion and relet for a term longer than the balance of time remaining under
the original lease. The court declared that the landlord's conduct, whatever
his intention, amounted to a surrender by operation of law.
"The assertion that the reletting is for the interest of the tenant is
gratuitous and unwarrantable, though if it were true, how could that fact tend
to show authority in the landlord to dispose of the tenant's property? 1' 2
The court particularly noticed those authorities which would allow the
landlord to make a new lease without losing the liability of the original
tenant but concluded:
"While there are many cases which hold to this view, the weight of
authority and the better reason is the other way."' 3
885 Cal. 119, 24 Pac. 633 (1890). The only authority cited by the court was GEAR, Landlord
and Tenant, §§ 128, 176 (1888). Accordingly, Mr. Gear may be said to be the "father" of the view
advanced. At § 176, he writes: "If the premises are abandoned without cause, the landlord may
elect to leave them vacant and recover rent, or to enter and determine the tenancy; but he cannot
both enter and treat the contract as subsisting; yet he may relet the premises for the benefit of the
tenant; though not bound to do so.... ." The cases to support the privilege of reletting were
referred to as "Meyer v. Smith, 33 Ark. 627; Langsdorf v. Legardeur, 27 La. An. 364; Ledoux v.
Jones, 20 La. An. 540; Roumage v. Blatrier, 11 Rob. (La.) 101; Holden v. Tanner, 6 La. An. 74;
Allen v. Saunders, 6 Neb. 436; Morgan v. Smith, 70 N.Y. 537, aff'g in part, 7 Hun. 244; Randall v.
Thompson, 1 Tex. App. Civ. Cases § 1102." It is noteworthy that the list is dominated by cases
from Louisiana, where the Civil Law prevailed.
889 Cal. 464, 26 Pac. 967 (1891).
" Id. at 466, 26 Pac. at 967.
"90 Cal. 507, 27 Pac. 369 (1891).
-Id. at 513, 27 Pac. at 371.
23 Ibid.
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But what of the 60-day-old rule of the Respini case? The court proceeded
to harmonize that ruling by giving some facts that were not included in
the report of the Respini case: The Respini lease included and was predomi-
nantly one of "a going dairy business." "It partook," to use the court's
words, "more of the nature of an ordinary contract that a grant of a term."
Thus, the Respini case could no longer be said to be authority for the
proposition that a landlord may relet and still hold the old tenant liable
for any deficiency; the recovery was one for breach of contract to operate
a dairy business, with the former rent merely furnishing a convenient
measure of damages.
In the course of the Welcome decision, the court suggested, however,
that a different result might have been realized if the landlord had notified
the tenant before going into possession that he would continue to hold the
tenant for rent, and that any new lease would be for the tenant's account.
More Cases: "Respini v. Welcome"
Bradbury v. Higginson4 appeared in the Supreme Court reports for
1912. The tenant had abandoned the premises six months before the
expiration of the term. The landlord did not relet the premises but, as
In re Bell, brought an action for the balance of the six months rent on the
theory that immediately upon the repudiation of the lease contract by the
tenant, the landlord might sue for the full amount which would have become
due had the contract run its full term.
Judge Sloss for the Supreme Court, adopted the opinion of the
District Court of Appeals which had reversed a judgment for the landlord,
the District Court holding that the suit was prematurely brought. The District
Court had said, however:
"That a landlord may have an action for damages for breach of con-
tract when a tenant abandons his lease is not questioned by any of the
authorities. His damages, however, in that event are to be ascertained in a
particular way. Where a lease is repudiated and the premises abandoned,
the landlord may pursue one of two courses: He may rest upon his contract
and sue his tenant as each installment of rent, or the whole thereof, becomes
due; or, he may take possession of the premises and recover damages, which
damages will be the difference between what he may be able to rent the
premises for and the price agreed to be paid under the lease." 15
Which are the authorities in which the District Court found such
unanimity? In re Bell and Respini v. Porta were cited, along with a case
in the Texas Civil Appeals and a citation to JONES, LANDLORD AND
TENANT. As to the latter, the section referred to related not to leases, but
to the measure of damages for breach of agreements to lease.
" 162 Cal. 602, 123 Pac. 797 (1912).
15 Id. at 604, 123 Pac. at 798.
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Oliver v. Loydon' 6 was also reported in 1912. It was held in that case
that the landlord failed to state a cause of action since the tenant was still
in possession. However, the Bradbury case was cited and approved by
dictum.
During 1916, the question of a tenant's continued liability was again
before the Supreme Court. In Triest & Co. v. Goldstone,17 a lease of commer-
cial property had been given to a corporation. The corporation forfeited
its charter before the term expired but the premises continued to be occupied
after being divided between two partnerships composed of individuals who
had been directors of the corporation. This arrangement was made with
the knowledge and acquiesence of the landlord. Subsequently, one of the
partnerships quit the premises and the landlord brought an action on the
original lease for accrued rents, against the corporation's erstwhile directors.
Judge Sloss adopted the opinion of the District Court of Appeals which
held that the landlord could not succeed in his action, surrender by operation
of law having released the corporation from any further obligation for
rent under the lease. The District Court had supported the result on the
authority of Welcome v. Hess.
In 1917, Bernard v. Renard"s appeared, as if to resolve the conflict
between the Bradbury and Triest & Co. cases. The landlord had given a
ten year lease, but a dispute having arisen, the tenant refused to go into
possession. During the next four years, the landlord had rented the premises
to a number of persons for short periods and small sums. The landlord
then brought an action against the original tenant and won a judgment for
$7,500. This judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court.
According to the epitomized briefs appearing in the AMERWCAN LAW
REPORTS annotation of the case, counsel for tenant had urged that there was
a surrender of the lease by the tenant and an acceptance by the landlord of
such surrender. The list of authorities was headed by Welcome v. Hess.
Counsel for the landlord urged, on the authority of Respini v. Porta,
that there was no surrender; and that the landlord had a duty to make a
subsequent letting, and that such a letting does not constitute an acceptance
of a surrender.
It was necessary, therefore, for the court to answer two questions: Did
the conduct result in a surrender by operation of law; and if so, did the
tenant's liability cease as of the date of the surrender? The court, approving
the doctrine of the Welcome case, answered both questions in the affirmative.
The court went on to offer its view on the matter implicit in the Welcome
case: Could the landlord have continued to hold the tenant liable for any
16 163 Cal. 124, 124 Pac. 731 (1912).
17173 Cal. 240, 159 Pac. 715 (1916).
18175 Cal. 230, 165 Pac. 694, 3 A.L.R. 1076 (1917).
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deficiency if he had given notice to the tenant that the reentry and reletting
were for the tenant's account? The court indicated that they would answer
"yes" to this question also.19
At Last "The Rule Is Well Settled"
By 1930 we are advised, in Phillips-Hollman, Inc. v. Peerless Stages,2"
that "The rule is well settled"--in favor of the Respini case and its learning!
However, the lease under consideration contained a provision which allowed
the landlord to reenter and relet upon abandonment by the tenant, and
that the tenant should not be released from liability for the full rental.
In 1932, in Treff v. Gulko,2l the landlord was unsuccessful in his
action, the tenant having been shown to be a mere "naked assignee" and
liable for rent only while he was in possession. Nevertheless, the court went
on to approve by dictum the "well settled rule" of the Phillips-Hollnun
case.
2 2
The Most Recent California Cases
The three most recent Supreme Court cases on the subject question
have one factor in common; in each case the lease contained a covenant
authorizing the landlord to reenter and make a new lease for the account
of the tenant.
Despite the covenant, judgment was against the landlord in Kulawitz v.
Pacific Paper Co. (1944),23 where the court held that the tenant had been con-
structively evicted, and allowed recission of the lease. Dictum in that case
approved the view that the landlord may "retake possession for the lessee's
account and relet the premises, holding the lessee for the difference between
the lease rentals and what it was able in good faith to procure by reletting."' 4
Almost identical language was used in De Hart v. Allen (1945).25
The new lease in that instance was authorized by express provision and, more-
over, the landlord had given notice to the tenant that the new lease would be
" On this point, the court cited with approval Rekopf v. Wirz, 31 Cal.App. 695, 161 Pac. 285
(1917). Dictum there had approved the give-notice-and-relet view on the strength, in turn, of
dictum in Baker v. Eilers Music Co., 26 Cal.App. 371, 146 Pac. 1056 (1913), based on the Bradbury,
supra note 10, and Oliver, supra note 11, cases.
20210 Cal. 253, 291 Pac. 178 (1930).
"214 Cal. 591, 7 P.2d 697 (1932).
22 Curiously, Siller v. Dunn, 103 Cal.App. 154, 284 Pac. 232 (1930), was also cited. The court
there, although of the opinion that the law "seems to be pretty well settled" on the continuing
liability of the old tenant, held that the act of the lessor in unqualifiedly taking possession of the
premises after the abandonment, and remodeling the building so as to fit it for an entirely different
use and purpose, established a surrender by operation of law despite a provision in the lease allowing
the landlord to reenter and make a new lease upon abandonment.
2 25 Cal.2d 664, 155 P.2d 24 (1944).
"2 The Treff case, supra note 16, and Siller case, supra note 17, were given as the supporting
authorities.
" 26 Cal.2d 829, 161 P.2d 453 (1945).
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made for the tenant's account. The case is noteworthy since the court went
on to say that they would be disposed to grant relief to the landlord, the
covenant and the notice aside.26
The most recent pertinent case before the Supreme Court to the date of
this comment was in 1950, Yates v. Reid.2" A provision which allowed
reletting was held valid and controlling and judgment was given for the
landlord. One sentence in the opinion, however, furnishes an appropriate
stopping off place for this chronology. ". . . The doctrine of the Welcome
case," we are informed by the court, "has not always been applied."
The Cases Categorized
To return to our original question, the landlord wants to know, "Can
I make a new lease and hold the old tenant liable for any deficiency in the
rent?"
Five of the Supreme Court cases have replied with an unqualified "Yes."
Such was the holding of In re Bell and the Bradbury cases, although in each
case the landlord was turned away with the advice that his action was for
damages and was prematurely brought. Dicta in the Treff and Oliver cases
gives numerical support to the "Yes" response. Only in Respini v. Porta
did the landlord get an affirmative reply and a judgment, and the case
continues to be widely cited for the proposition that one may have a new
lease and his old tenant too.
The "Maybe" decisions of the Supreme Court-where the new lease
was made under a covenant of the original lease-are four in number.
Such a covenant was upheld and enforced in the Phillips-Hollman, De Hart
and Yates cases and, but for the constructive eviction of the tenant, would
no doubt have been given the same effect in the Kulawitz case as well.
On three occasions, the Supreme Court has turned the landlord away
with a "No" reply, holding that the new lease was inconsistent with the
continuance of the old tenancy, and that accordingly a surrender by opera-
tion of law had been perfected and the old tenant freed from further liability
for rent. Such was the result in the Welcome, Triest & Co. and Bernard
cases. In each of the three cases, the court approved by dictum a rule which
would allow the landlord further recourse against the tenant, should the
landlord give notice that the reentry and reletting were for the tenant's
account.
What Is the Rule in California?
On the over-all, it can be said that the balance is at least somewhat in
favor of those cases that are oriented in terms of "lease contract" and the
-" The decision was rested on the Treff case, supra note 16, the Phillips-Hollman case, supra
note 16, and the Oliver case, supra iote 11.
27 36 CaL2d 383, 224 P.2d 8 (1950).
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landlord's privilege to "mitigate the damages" should such lease be "repudi-
ated" by the tenant. Unfortunately, not one of the five cases upholding this
view have presented a critical anlysis of the problem or set out any cogent
reasons for the result. Nevertheless, these cases have been frequently cited
and followed in the District Courts of Appeal and elsewhere,2" and have
acquired whatever verity repetition can give.
The recent cases-the "Maybe" cases involving covenants which permit
reletting-decidedly add to the weight of those cases favoring the "contract"
view. They have in general been decided on a very broad basis with the court
virtually saying that, were such covenants not present, they would imply them
and allow the landlord to recover any deficiency under a new lease.
Those cases which are reasoned in terms of conveyancing may by no means
be said to be no longer of value as authorities. Their persuasive force has
swayed many lower courts in the past, and continues to do so.29 Everything
taken into consideration, the belief that, given a proper case, the "convey-
ancing" view might still prevail before the Supreme Court is justified.
What Should the Rule Be?
It cannot be denied that any rule which strictly applies the doctrine
of surrender by operation of law impales the landlord on the horns of a
dilemma when the tenant abandons the premises. If the landlord reenters
and exercises dominion over the place, he no longer has a tenant to look
to; if the landlord stays out of possession, the premises remain idle and
unproductive of income, and the landlord must undertake the risk and
inconvenience of bringing an action or actions as the rent accrues.
On the other hand, a rule which is reasoned in terms of contract obliga-
tion is no cure-all for the landlord's problem. At least so long as its basis
and limits continue to be only vaguely defined, such a rule may create
as many troublesome problems as it is able to solve. Moreover, the remedy
itself is not very satisfactory; the landlord must wait until the end of the
original term, when his damages will be finally ascertained, before he may
bring an action and this may involve a considerable length of time.
After examining all of the cases, the conclusion cannot be avoided
that perhaps the analysis employed by the court in Welcome v. Hess furnishes
the solidest basis for a solution-one that is in keeping with the practicalities
of the situation without doing too great violence to legal principle. That is,
the nature of a lease as a conveyance is given full recognition but the
"s The latest case available at the time of this comment may be found in Cook v. Goldsmith,
133 Cal.App.2d 804, 284 P.2d 542 (1955).
"9 See the forceful opinion by Peters, P. J., in Dorcich v. Time Oil Co., 103 Cal.App.2d 677,
230 P.2d 10 (1951).
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harshness of surrender by operation of law is mitigated if the landlord gives
timely notice of his intention to the tenant.
Such an "intermediate" view is fair to the tenant as well as to the
landlord. The requisite notice may well convince the tenant to face rather
than spurn his obligation to the landlord, and by his own efforts seek to
assign the balance of the term or make a sublease. Or, the tenant may agree
that the landlord may proceed and attempt to reduce the liability of the
tenant for rent by making an assignment or sublease as the tenant's agent.
If these courses fail to lead to a solution, then the courts would be clearly
justified in creating some fictional means to equalize the situation of the
parties, and allow the landlord to install a new tenant and still be able to
recover any deficiency from the old tenant.
In any event, it is for the Supreme Court of California to bring order
to the chaos that presently prevails. Hope springs eternal, and perhaps at an
early date the court may entertain an appropriate case and, after examining
all of the factors involved, set the law straight on this practical problem of
everyday occurrence.
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